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Introduction

This series of Occasional Papers is designed to bring to the attention of the reader
work that focuses on Asian communication and culture. Compared to most areas
of Asian Studies, communication and media have been largely ignored, a fact the
recent Australian 'push into Asia' reveals. These Occasional Papers redress this
absence and deal with a comprehensive range of issues that inform our
understanding of the importance of communication in forging links between
Australia and Asia. Consequently their scope is far-reaching, covering cultural,
political, economic, and increasingly, technological topics and their relationship
to the communication process that lies at the heart of Australian/Asian relations.
In short, they will chart a new emerging mediascape in the Asia Pacific region.
As such they must be viewed as work in progress. The authors published in this
series include academics, journalists and post-graduate students from Australia
and throughout Asia.
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Chapter 1
Introduction: New Channels of Communicati on
In May 1992 soldiers from the Thai army turned their guns on middle class and
student demonstrators who were on the streets of Bangkok pressing for the
resignation of the military -backed prime minister - General Suchinda
Kraprayoon. A BBC camera crew was there. Among the burning cars and
barricades, the crew filmed an anonymous young Thai man. The close-up image
of his face filled the camera operator's viewfinder. He shouted in clear English:
"We want the rest of the world to see and hear what the military dictators do to
our people, the Thai people, the innocent people. We want the rest of the world
to know. " 1 Then the BBC crew filmed soldiers walking across the prostrate
bodies of people they had arrested and placed in the lobby of the Royal Hotel,
occasionally hitting them with the butts of rifles. Outside, in the hotel forecourt,
other demonstrators were placed face down, "trussed like chickens, hands bound
by the shirts off their backs". 2

Within hours, these images had been sent via satellite in a report to the BBC
World Service Television ( BBCWST) newsroom in London. Shortly
aftenvards, the report was beamed via the AsiaSat 1 satellite directly into
millions of homes across Asia on a BBCWST news bulletin ... a free service
that had been operating to Asia for less than a year. Among the viewers were
thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, of Bangkok residents.
At the same time, Thailand's long-established state-run television stations were
telling viewers that the 'madness'-' on the streets was being formented by 'rioters'
and 'troublemakers·• from the Communist Party of Thailand with support from
foreign communist groups. 5 Although Thai television camera crews had
recorded the violence, the government stations did not use the pictures.
For weeks afterwards videotaped copies of the BBC reports, contradicting the
regime's line, were selling on the streets of Bangkok for 200 baht (A$12). The
Far Eastern Economic Review reported: "[C]rowds gather in homes, university
campuses, and video rental shops to witness what the discredited government of
prime minister Suchinda Kraprayoon would not permit to be broadcast locally."6

Clearly, at this time of national crisis, the loss of the state ' s monopoly on
televised information was brought sharply into focus.
This episode neatly illustrates the central issue in this paper: the relationship
between state power and the new international satellite news services. Do the
economic and technological movements behind these services - which do not
respect frontiers - spell the end of state sovereignty in the regulation of televisual
information? What do the changes mean for politics in the region - a region
whose development has been premised on authoritarian media policies? These
questions cross many sectors of political science: theories of communication, of
the state, of democratic transition and of international political economy.
At the heart of this changed broadcasting landscape is a technological
development known as Direct Broadcasting by Satellite - or DBS. DBS allows
television signals to be relayed via satellite directly to a home, hotel or business
from a distant location, possibly another country. The signal is received by a
satellite dish, otherwise known as a parabolic antenna. The most common, and
affordable, parabolic antennae are one to three metres in diameter and cost
between US$400 and US$1,200. The DBS system bypasses all terrestrial relay
equipment, which has traditionally been under state control. In parts of
Southeast Asia, such as Indonesia, parabolic antennae are now common features
in both urban and rural areas. With this te.c hnology, many established
broadcasting regulations are largely irrelevant.
In Southeast Asia, two key satellite systems have been central to the delivery of
DBS news services - Palapa and AsiaSat I. By the end of the century there will
be many more systems. Palapa is the oldest of the existing systems. It is owned
and controlled by the Indonesian government and is currently used by a range of
domestic and international broadcasters. 7 Palapa's primary footprint covers an
area from northern Australia to southern China and Bangladesh. 8 From the
perspective of this paper, Palapa's most important customer is the Cable News
Network (CNN), which began a free-to-air service in 1991. Australia Television
the Australian Broadcasting Corporation's external television service - became
another broadcaster to use Palapa in 1993. The other satellite system is Asia Sat I
which has two footprints covering an area from the eastern Mediterranean, to the
Horn of Africa, to India, Sumatra then north to eastern Russia then across
somhern China to the Crimean states. AsiaSat I delivers Star TV 9 - since
October 1993 controlled by Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation. Star TV is a
network of five channels.
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Originally, both AsiaSatl footprints carried BBCWST on the Star network.
However, the BBC service was dropped on the northern footprint in April 1994
to placate the Chinese government, with whose blessing Murdoch was hoping to
tap into the Chinese market. 10 Beijing authorities had been unsettled by
Murdoch's proclamation after his purchase last year of Star TV that satellite
technology meant 'totalitarian regimes' could no longer halt the free-flow of
information. 11 Shortly after Murdoch's pronouncement, Beijing introduced
sweeping restrictions against private ownership of parabolic antennae. 12 Perhaps
the Chinese Government was mindful what had occurred on the streets of
Bangkok in 1992. Murdoch's subsequent decision to prevent BBCWST from
being beamed into China via the Star newtork shows that there are forms of state
power that can influence outcomes in the DBS industry.
This is more broadly reflected by the many agreements between the DBS
networks and terrestrial broadcasters in Southeast Asia for the relaying or
replaying of the international news services. The terrestrial broadcasters, some
of them state-controlled stations, receive the DBS service via a parabolic antenna
then play out the material using ground-based systems such as microwave or
cable. These are known as hybrid systems . Under these arrangements, an
element of control remains with the terrestrial broadcaster to cut off or censor
news, an option that has been used already in Thailand. In this way, the state
maintains its status as 'gatekeeper' over television information. Clearly, in
Southeast Asia there exists an environment for dynamic political and commercial
interaction in the satellite television industry.
This monograph will analyse the politics associated with the arrival of these
international news services in the Southeast Asian region. Four countries of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) will be studied. They are
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. The paper considers the impact of
DBS news and information on the conduct of politics in those countries. As well ,
it investigates - and seeks to explain - why there has been such a diversity of
policy between the four governments, with the more economically advanced
being the most resistant to international DBS television.
The arrival in Southeast Asia of these DBS news services has been something of
a shock for a region accustomed to state-controlled television news and high
levels of government control of media in general. CNN and BBCWST are 24
hour news and information channels. While much of the programming is rooted
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in the affairs of Europe and America, and quite detached from the news agenda
of the region, crucial international and regional events are, for the first time,
being delivered with Western-liberal journalistic style and methods. As well as
the Thai uprising, there has been extensive coverage of events such as the Gulf
War, communal violence in India and national elections in the United States, the
Philippines and Japan.
Some commentators record that this type of satellite service "defies the tradition
that national sovereignty includes state control over television within a nation ' s
borders." 13 Arthur C. Clarke comments in the Far Eastern Economic Review
that "there'll soon be an enormous amount of free news broadcasts which will
cross all borders".' 4 Prima Facie, the technological and commercial structures
behind DBS news do undermine the tradition of sovereign control of the
electronic mass media. However, the popular image of continuous Western-style
news being on offer to the peoples of Southeast Asia- challenging governments'
version of events - needs to be put into context.
In the short time since free-to-air DBS news has become available, its level of
penetration into countries of ASEAN has varied widely. In the most
economically developed nation, Singapore, parabolic antennae are illegal - and
virtually non-ex istent. 15 The Malaysian government has banned parabolic
antennae and is threatening to fine or imprison those who do not comply, but
their use remains widespread. 16 On the other hand, Indonesia has an
increasingly liberal policy under which more than half a million parabolic
antennae dot the country. 17 Thailand has a laissez-faire policy, having dropped
a licensing system in 1992. The number of hotels and English-speaking
households with a parabolic antenna capable of taking in services from the
Palapa satellite system is put at 4 I 7,000 in Indonesia, 56,000 in Thailand and,
despite the bans, 18,000 in Malaysia.'s
From the perspective of both theory and empirical data, published research on
the topic ofDBS in Southeast Asia has been sparse. Several explanations can be
offered for the scarcity of material: for example, the lack of resources and
encouragement for critical indigenous inquiry into the politics of information;
the dynamic nature of the medium and the constantly changing nature of the
political process relating to the industry; or the apparent preference among
Western researchers to focus on case studies in the developed world.
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Transnational DBS news services have been operating for almost a decade in
parts of Europe and North America. Consequently, the analyses of the impact on
the Euro-American scene are more numerous, although they vary widely in their
conceptual, theoretical and methodological perspectives. This paper needs to be
analytically sensitive to the cultural and political differences that exist between
the cases in ASEAN countries and those in the Euro-American context. Refining
a framework pertinent to Southeast Asia is a formidable challenge.
There are four broad categories of relevant literature. They are considered here
in order of theoretical complexity, beginning with the least sophisticated.
A vigorous, but highly descriptive, body of material emerges from the Asian
press. About 200 articles are used to piece together recent developments in the
DBS news industry in Southeast Asia. They contain relevant and useful
technical data. In the case of Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the items tend
to reinforce or defend government broadcasting policy. Ironically, owing to the
sensitivity towards media analysis among ASEAN governments, the most
comprehensive press coverage of a country's DBS policy is often found in the
newspapers of neighbouring countries. For instance, the Malaysian press is quite
willing to canvass issues relating to Singapore - and vice versa - but press
reporting about one's own country is largely confined to official statements.
Thailand is the exception. The Bangkok press has been a platform for open
debate on Thai satellite television policy, due both to the liberal traditions in the
industry and the commercial interests in television sought by the large newspaper
organisations in Bangkok. Press articles are central to the task of analysing the
events surrounding the May 1992 Thai civil uprising in Chapter 5. In addition,
the Hong-Kong business press - notably the Far Eastern Economic Review and
the Asian Wall Street Journal -provides key source material. The fact that these
journals tend to editorially reflect economic rationalist and deregulatory policies
needs to be kept in mind, as do their frequent clashes with authorities in
Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia.
Second, there is a relative abundance of literature outlining the official
broadcasting policies of the ASEAN governments. This is in the form of articles
and conference papers presented to forums linked to organisations such as the
Asia Pacific Broadcasting Union (ABU) and the Asian Mass Communication
Research and Information Centre (AMIC). Sometimes, these are polemical
works, whose authors seek to explain media policy in terms of the imperatives of
nation building and national cohesion. It is not unusual in these works for the
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Western-liberal media ethos to be criticised as being impractical and culturally
insensitive. This literature appears to be rekindling the 'media imperialism'
debate .
This brings us to the third category of literature: that concerning international
news flow . It is an important precursor to the topic at hand and has commanded
considerable attention from governments, international organisations, academics
and journalists- reaching a crescendo in the early 1980s after the publication of
the MacBride Commission report to UNESC0. 19 Primarily, media imperialism
refers to the perceived imbalance in the international flow of information including news - that has emerged within the global network of cultural and
economic relations . Within this structure the transnational European and USbased news organisations report some 90 per cent of the world's news.20
In the eyes of representatives of developing countries, this 'cartel' of agencies
represents the cultural, political and economic interests of the West. The flow of
information is "uni-directional and vertical, from North to South for the most
part". 21 The MacBride report argues that : "[T]he one-way flow in
communications is basically a reflection of the world's dominant political and
economic structures, which tend to maintain or reinforce the dependence of
poorer countries on the richer". 22 With these themes in mind, a useful working
definition of media imperialism can be stated thus: "[T]he process whereby the
ownership, structure, distribution or content of the media in any one country are
singly or together subject to substantial pressure from the media interests of any
other country or countries without proportionate reciprocation of influence by the
country so affected". 23
While the force of these sentiments remains pertinent, technological and political
developments have changed key institutional arrangements for the transmission
and exchange of news. Firstly, the increased access to satellite services has seen
a growth in the past ten years of television news exchange. On the global level
-and perhaps reflecting the 'media imperialism' structure detected in the print
news agencies - the industry is dominated by Reuters Television (formerly
Visnews) and Worldwide Television News (WTN, formerly UPITN) . These
agencies provide material to the four ASEAN countries in this study.
However, on a regional level, there has been increased cooperation in news
exchange. The Asian Pacific Broadcasting Union (ABU) is the most relevant to
this study. Elsewhere in the world there are similar regional groupings such as
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the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) and the Arab States Broadcasting
Union. The ABU has in place arrangements for Asian broadcasters to exchange
news material and embark on collaborative projects.
Until very recently, Reuters Television, WTN and ABU exchange structures
were the only mechanisms to bring material to international television news
audiences in ASEAN countries on a daily basis. The material was, however,
subject to editorial control by the rules of each country. The gatekeeper role of
the state was maintained. Clearly, the direct broadcasting into homes by satell ite
of uncensored material from Western news companies represents a huge leap
from the news exchange arrangements.
There has been a failure to detect the significance of that leap in some literature.
For instance, Gurevitch considers the international news agenc ies, the regional
news agencies and the direct satellite broadcasters such as BBC and CNN as
three 'arms' of "a complex international system of international distribution and
exchange."N I would argue that, in the Southeast Asian context, the DBS players
represent an entirely new variable in regional politics because of their abi lity to
largely avoid laws and control of states. They need to be considered as a factor
further along the evolutionary con tinuum of international communications.
In an effort to clarify the significance of the global DBS news arrangements, we
turn to a fourth category of literature, wh ich rarely mentions issues in Asia, but
is central to this paper. It is concerned with communications as a component of
changing international economic and political structures, especially the global
movement of capital and search for economies of scale gained by reaching the
audiences of the developing world. The rise of the 'new media' - cable and
satellite television - stems from a cross cutting of technological, econom ic and
political variables.
The vast bulk of this literature focuses on Western Europe. The region was, after
all, one of the first to have to deal with satellite television services cutting across
borders and diverse language gro ups. There are strong grounds for applying
elements of communications theory developed in the Western European arena to
cases in this paper. Notions of national sovereignty are broadly the same in a
Western European and Southeast Asian context. Equally, each region has a
highly developed international grouping: the European Union (EU) and ASEAN.
Since the 1970s the ASEAN states have also become increasingly intertwined
within global economic networks . The universality of the commercial
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imperatives of satellite television means both Europe and Asia will feel its
effects.
The driving forces behind these imperatives are the economies of scale gained by
the transnational media conglomerates from the larger international audiences.

Poweiful international economic influences are helping to design the future
of the media. With the increasing internationalisation of capital and the
growth of the transnational economy it would, in fact, be unthinkable for
television to remain rooted within domestic settings only. In years to come
it may become even more detached from its cultural roots as a new categ01y
of television - an international categoty- takes on greater significance. 25
In light of these developments , concerns about sovereignty have emerged. The
EU report - TV Broadcasting in Europe and the New Technologies posits:

The geopolitical boundaries of Europe are destroyed by the new technologies
for distributing electronic messages and the twelve member states become,
with the throwing of one switch, a single market and viewing audience. 26
Sovereignty in the European context appears to be more concerned with the
politics of culture rather than the politics of domestic administration.
[B)ecause the various forms of broadcasting by satellite straddle national
frontiers, there are implications for those nations which desire to retain and
encourage their own cultures in the face of foreign broadcasting .~
7

This emphasis is understandable. The strength of socio-political institutions and
relative stability of political ideology across Western Europe does not elevate
questions of political information to the level found in Southeast Asian countries.
The European studies tend to concentrate on concerns about cultural integrity,
rather than overt domestic political tensions stemming from news and
information services.
Without doubt, ' cultural integrity' is also an important issue in Southeast Asia.
Governments, particularly Malaysia and Singapore, frequently oppose satellite
broadcasting on the basis of the violence or perceived immorality of Western
drama and pop culture such as music. Non-news programming is not, however,
the focus of attention in this paper. The political implications of satellite services
such as MTV, Home Box Office or US sports channels will not be specifically
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canvassed. News and information services are the central focus of this
monograph. It should be noted though that the same economic forces lie behind
the proliferation of drama and pop culture DBS services in Southeast Asia. Like
news, pop culture is a valuable commodity. Television programming is now no
different from other goods and services. It can be traded freely. Although, as the
media imperialism model suggests, the dominant global political and econom ic
systems mean the trade is likely to flow in greater volume from the West to the
developing regions. As will be shown in this paper, the genesis of international
satellite television is rooted in economic opportunities.
The sharp differences in concerns over 'sovereignty' of televisusal information
between Western European and Southeast Asian states perhaps reflects different
stages of political development. While the ASEAN governments are still
engaged in 'nation building', the Western Europeans are tentatively becoming
more politically integrated under arrangements such as the treaties of Rome and
Maastricht. The notion of satellite television 'destroying' political boundaries,
as outlined in the EU report, is anathema to the Southeast Asian government
leaderships.
These differences are reflected by the extent to which each has moved towards
regional cooperation. While satellite communications policy in Europe has been
steered towards regulatory harmonisation across the economic community, the
Southeast Asian governments have, until this year, been stridently unilateral in
their policy development. In 1993 Khushu noted: "At the regional level there has
been no concerted move to harmonise telecommunications policies, including
those which concern sate llite delivery. The first, tentative moves have been
made this year with a proposal by the ABU for a code of ethics for satellite
broadcasters beaming services into the region. As yet, only the Philippines
government has expressed an interest in making the code legis lati vely
enforceable." 28
Developments in Southeast Asia are in sharp contrast to those in Europe where
there has been a move towards the adop tion of an 'Ope n Skies' policy.'"
Europe's policy has evo lved from the coinc iden ce of broad EU policy
harmonisation and terrestrial broadcasting deregulation. The commercial
opportunities driving satellite television have been given political backing by the
EU's constituent governments. The EU's White Paper on the internal market
argues that "an ex tended market in broadcasting will bring economies of scale
and improve the international trading position of member states". 30 These widely
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differing policy directions highlight the need for caution when drawing on
European experiences for theoretical guidance on Southeast Asia. Nonetheless,
the factor of economic opportunity in the arrival and development of satellite
television is clearly central in both cases.
Despite the sharp differences in responses to satellite broadcasting between
Western Europe and Southeast Asia, they share the experience of significant
policy disarray. Negrine's Satellite Broadcasting: The Politics and Implications
of the New Media/' was one of the first works to articulate this phenomenon.

The changes currently taking place are at such an advanced stage of
development that academic or even policy debates matter little in the rapidly
changing world of the new media. The speed of technological change and the
inability (or unwillingness) of govemments across the world to plan (or place
in a strait jacket) the direction of these development, has given the look of an
unstoppable force. 31
This idea that governments have failed to match the policy demands arising from
the commercial development of satellite networks will be considered in this
paper in the Southeast Asian arena. It is especially curious that while satellite
television has seemed "an unstoppable force" in the West, two ASEAN
governments in this study have indeed attempted, drawing on Negrine's
phrasing, to place it in a ' strait jacket'. The results have been mixed.
A subsequent - and important - theoretical development by Negrine and
Papathanassopoulos focuses on the relationship between states and transnational
broadcasters 3-'
Primarily, it explores the ability of states to constrain
developments in satellite broadcasting in the highly complex world marketplace
of communications and information. Attention is paid to the conceptualisation
of state sovereignty, with focus on the 'realist-sovereign' paradigm versus the
'interdependence' approach.

While the realist model of sovereignty assumes that each nation state makes
its own individual calculations of self-interest, the interdependence model
emphasises that in place of a single decision-making body, there may be
several layers of collaboration -from the political to the bureaucratic, from
public state organisations to private economic actors -all attempting to
'manage' or 'stir' the links which emerge. Similarly, whereas in the 'realistsovereign' model, the bargaining between the state and other states is the
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focus, in the 'interdependence' model the suggestion is that govern ments
counter the loss of autonomous control either by exploiting the network of
interdependent relationships in order to extract suitable economic or other
rewards for internal consumption, or by identifying the collective policy
network with significant policy ends. 3-1
The interdependence model is clearly more sophisticated and can accommodate
the variables that arise from the array of data incorporated in this paper. It avoids
the pitfalls of the descriptive analysis in much of the liberal press. Writers from
this tradition have failed to pay sufficient attention to the complexity of state
power and tended to treat the intrusion of satellite news as a zero-sum game with
each state. Evidence introduced in this paper, especially that examining the case
of the Indonesian state, attests to the efficacy of Negrine and
Papathanassopoulos' approach to the interdependence theory.
The above overview shows that, like governmental policy, academic analysis
is lagging well behind technological and economic developments in the region.
The limited work on Europe provides a starting point for analysis of Southeast
Asia's DBS experience. As well, there is an abundance of empirical data relating
to the DBS sector in the four ASEAN countries. Obvious key differences
between the regions are the system of state organisation and the contemporary
roles of state broadcasters.
In addition, the research for this paper has been conducted with a broader
theoretical tradition in mind: that developed in the vigorous literature on
democratisation in Latin America and East Asia in the 1970s and 1980s. The
work of O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead focuses on the episodic roles of
elites and leaders within broader economic and political frameworks.

An underlying thread throughout the work [of O'Donnell et a/] is the
acceptance of the type of behavioralist propositions often associated with
Juan Linz, in which individual decisions and ongoing strategic interaction do
matter even if generally constrained by objective stmctural conditions ...
Structural conditions are important, to be sure, analysis of their impact must
be overlapped with conjunctural and other superstructural factors that
broaden the range of indeterminacy with regard to possible outcomes.J5
This approach will allow for detailed empirical evidence to be introduced and
explored within the context of broader economic and socio-political movements.

II

In this paper, the overarching movement in the case of ASEAN has been the
internationalisation of its economies and the cotTesponding inflow of capital and
investment funds. Some of this investment has been directed at the news and
information industry. In this environment, attempts by government regimes to
quarantine economic liberalism from the political landscape have led to tensions
between classes and between elements of the state elite. Analysis is enriched by
looking at the strategic decisions and actions by individuals and groups.
Finally, in addition to the the written primary and secondary sources, a number
of interviews were conducted for this paper. 36 Interviewees include senior
managers from the BBC and Australia Television, industry analysts in Indonesia,
Thailand and Malaysia and a Western diplomat based in Bangkok. Several have
requested anonymity. In these cases a description of their positions will be used
when they are quoted.

Summary
The focus of this thesis is how the international DBS services impact upon the
state. The paper will analyse and explain the diversity of responses between the
four ASEAN states to DBS and consider the sustainability of each policy.
Drawing on detailed case studies, it will consider the effect of the satellite news
services on political patterns in Southeast Asia.
These issues will be dealt with in four substantive chapters. The historic role of
mass media - particularly television- in the context of state power in Singapore,
Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand will be explored in Chapter 2.
The arrival of international satellite television news services in Southeast Asia
will be traced in Chapter 3. Driven by the search for new markets and associated
economies of scale, the transnational media organisations are able to overcome
long-established regulatory frameworks using new technology and economic
power. The news traditions and perspectives of the transnational broadcasting
organisations - which often lie at odds with state broadcasters - will be
canvassed.
Chapter 4 considers the political issues arising from the establishment of the
services, by analysing the complex interaction of economic, political and
technological change. The responses to satellite television, including attempts
by some governments to quarantine direct satellite broadcasts from other areas
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-of commercial activity, will be explored. A key task here is tracing the tension
between ec onomic libera lism a nd politi ca l a uthoritariani sm. Episodes of
collaboration and conflict occur between different levels of the state apparatus
and transnational economic players. Finally, the impact of international satellite
news on patterns of political di scourse will be ca nvassed. Importa ntly , this
includes changes to the structure and content of domestic television policy.
The civil uprising in Thailand in May 1992 will be considered in so me detail in
Chapter 5 in order to exam ine the effect of international telev ision in times of
national cri sis. It is the first s uch crisis to emerge in Southeast Asia since the
arrival of the DBS news services. Much of the political momentum behind the
civil unrest is attributed to Bangkok's rising middle class. DBS is shown to be
one of the critical factors in the dynamic information environment that developed
during the crisi s period. Additionally, individuals are shown to affect outcomes,
although their options are confined within broad political and eco nomi c
structures.
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Chapter 2
ASEAN's 'Nation-Building' Media
"Tell the journalists not to worsen the situation and cause unrest among the
public through their questions to the officials about the real situation ... "
President Suharto to Information Minister Harmoko, June 1989. '
The overwhelming influences behind the shaping of the contemporary news
media in Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia have been the historic struggles
against colonialism and the subsequent state led task of ' nation building ' .
Sovereignty is a prize of independence - and is jealously guarded by the state
apparatus. More recently, the governments of these countries have sought to aid
nation-building by exposing their economies to international commerce. In
effect, they have become developmentalist regimes which want their economies
to change- while the political systems remain stable. Thai land has a unique
political tradition, a reflection of its precarious independence- maintained in the
era of high colonialism when territories around it were governed by European
powers. The Thai press is liberal, while television is heavily state-controlled.
This chapter will develop the links between nation building, mass media and
state structure. Theories of the modern state relating to nation building reach the
very heart of the media control issue: state power. In the words of Lent,
Southeast Asian domestic news providers have been required to "support and
cooperate with the authorities by stressing positive news, by ignoring much
negative and oppositionist information, and by supporting governmental plans
and ideologies" 2 Television is crucial to this strategy.
State broadcasters are at the centre of the television industry in the four countries.
In Singapore the Singapore Broadcasting Corporation remains the sole
broadcaster, while in Thailand the five networks are controlled either by the
government or the military, which are often the same thing .3 Elsewhere in
ASEAN, where commercial networks exist, they are politically and
economically linked to the ruling elite. Malaysia's single commercial network TV3 -is owned by the Fleet group, which is closely aligned to the ruling party,

14

United Malays National Organisation (UMN0) .4 Indonesia's first and biggest
commercial channel Rajawali Citra Televisi Indonesia (RCTI) belongs to the
Bimantara group whose chairman is Bam bang Trihatmodjo - the son of President
Suharto. 5
At the end of this chapter, attention will turn to the broad economic movements
that begin to erode state control of mass media. In the case of Indonesia, early
involvement in the international communications marketplace is shown to
introduce policy contradictions. It is a forerunner of tensions which are to
emerge in all states based on attempts to maintain state control of a commodity
- news - that is becoming increasingly internationalised due to economic and
technological change.

It is only by understanding the contemporary histories of the four states that one
can fully appreciate the significance of the arrival of satellite television serv ices
such as BBCWST or CNN. The vastly different assumptions underlying the
state media systems and the Western-liberal broadcasters suggest their meeting
will result in both conflict and change.
Consider Article I of the Indonesian Journalists' Association's code of ethics,
which states: "An Indonesian journalist shall be ... faithful to Pancasila". 6
Pancasila is the official state ideology of Indonesia and is embodied in the
preamble to the country's 1945 constitution. 7 What this means for media
philosophy in Indonesia is neatly summarised by Mehra:

Pancasila society disapproves of individualism and individual rights, the
starting point of Westem liberal political the01y. It consequelltly rejects the
notion of an uninhibited and robust press that undertakes vehement, caustic
and unpleasant attacks on govemment and pubic officials the sine qua non of
Westem press theory. Instead, the press is viewed as a partner in national
developmellt, within the framework of Pancasila."'
Clearly, some Western communications analysts would refute the characteristics
ascribed to their media systems by Mehra. However, his summary of the state
philosophy underlines the epistemological complexity of analysing the politics
of news in Southeast Asia . Issues of social organisation, economics, nationhood ,
state power and development are raised in Mehra's formulation, which stand at
odds with Western liberal precepts.
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In an effort to account for this complexity, it is worth recalling the words of
Adams relating to the variety of structural parameters surrounding news. "News
production requires debatable decisions about priorities and depiction of events
and issues. These decisions are made within the confines of cultural, legal,
poHtical, technical and commercial interests." 9 There is clearly margin for wide
differences of opinion and approach to news.
Power and the 'invention' of the nation-state in 'Nation-building' is a recurring
theme in the communications literature of the developing world. Considerable
scholarly debate has surrounded theories of the modern state which delve into the
concept of 'nation'. A key question is whether the sentiment of nation is a
natural and spontaneous sentiment arising from among the people or an artificial
construct imposed by powerful forces from above. More simply, is the national
consciousness that underlies the sense of nation 'primordial' or 'invented ' ? If it
is invented, who benefits?
Anderson contends that the modern nation requires strangers to imagine
themselves united as part of a large-scale community. Subsequently, "the nation
exists as much in people's minds as it does in the world". 10 But achieving that
sense of shared identity, especially among peoples as diverse as those in ASEAN
countries, would require mobilisation of mass media and educational institutions
to promote symbols of a common heritage. This alludes to Hobsbawm's concept
of the 'invention of tradition': "[T]he nation, with its associated phenomena:
nationalism, the nation-state, national symbols, histories and the rest .. . rest on
exercises of social engineering which are often deliberate and always
innovative."''
Smith perhaps puts it more simply: "Today, in many parts of Africa and Asia, it
is the state itself, through its economic policies, its political patronage and mass
educations system, that seeks, with varying success, to create and narrate the
emergent nation." 12 There would appear to be little objection to these political
methods from the leaderships of countries in this study. The heads of certain
ASEAN governments are among the leading proponents of media involvement
in nation-building.
For instance, Lee Kuan Yew, when Prime Minister of Singapore, told US
newspaper editors: "From ... unpromising beginnings we have had to try to build
one nation .. . [W]e have to create enough shared va lues and a single national
identity ... [W]e hope ... to bring the press in the different languages closer
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-together, approximating, however inadequately, one national view." 13 In a
speech on Indonesia's National Press Day in 1989, President Suharto
proclaimed: "One area of activity which needs follow-up by the national press is
the wider dissemination of information about progress, the creation of new
values and the formation of public opinion, all of which will help us be a strong
nation . The press should be a partner in the process of nation building.""
But these proclamations by political leaders take nations as a given mode of
political organisation. Difficulties with this assumption are voiced by Gellner:

Nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men [sic] as an inherent
though long-delayed political destiny, are a myth; nationalism, which
sometimes take pre-existing cultures and tums them into nations, sometimes
invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures: that is a reality, for
better or worse, and in general an inescapable one. 15
Analysis of nation-building needs to be taken further, to the very centre of the
study of politics - power. A very effective encapsulation of this idea is put by
Breuilly: "[N]ationalism is, above and beyond all else, about politics, and politics
is about power. Power, in the modern world, is primarily about the control of the
state". 16 Clearly this line of argument is central to explaining the relationships
between media and state power in Southeast Asia.
Another key concept that has evolved alongside nation-building is 'development
journalism' . In 1964, Schramm identified the use of media by developing states
to "contribute to the feeling of nationhood, to help teach the necessary skills and
technology, to extend the effective market, to aid the process of national
planning, and to prepare people to play new roles in a modernising society". 17
This developmental perspective argues that the Western liberal model of a
critical, adversarial media is not appropriate for ASEAN states, even though
member countries, such as Singapore, are well beyond the 'developing' stage.
This lends support to the idea, articulated by Lent, that the persistence of the
developmental policy can be attributed to attempts by government regimes to
maintain political obedience. Lent argues a key government control mechanism
is "the misuse of development communication to uncritically promote
governmental policies and nationalleaderships". 18

17

Malaysia's Media: "An Instrument of Leadership"
Malaysian news providers, like their Indonesian counterparts, are required to
follow a national philosophy- Rukunegara. Although there are similarities with
Indonesia's Pancasi la, Malaysia's philosophy appears less pervasive. 19 In
general, the state keeps a tight rein on news and information through specific
press laws and broader rules relating to perceived sedition, internal security and
official secrets. Some forty seven pieces of legislation and ordinances affect
mass media operations in the country. ~0 Some date to the colonial era, such as the
Printing Presses and Periodicals Act ( 1948), which was revised in 1971 .21 Means
says the existing UMNO administration, led by Mahathir Mohamad, assumes
"that the mass media must be organised and utilised as an instrument of
leadership to achieve national development goa ls and the ideals of the
Rukunegara while avoiding any divisive public controversies or inflaming
communal passions over the 'sensitive issues' ." 22 Communalism appears to be
particularly important, as it is a recurring theme in government papers justifying
media control.
The multi-racial makeup of Malaysia is reflected in its press. In 1989, there were
thirty-five daily newspapers in the country, twenty published in Mandarin, eight
in English, three in the national language, Bahasa Malaysia, three in Tamil and
one in Malayalam, a language spoken in southwest India. 23 Aga in st this
background, racial harmony emerges as a key component of nation-building and
national development. The Prime Minister - Mahathir Mohamad - alluded to this
theme when outlining media policy in 1985.

For a society precariously balanced on the razor's edge, where one false or
even true word can lead to calamity, it is criminal irresponsibility to allow
that one word to be uttered. 24
Broadly speaking, developmental perspectives remain de rigeur in the Malaysian
media. Madzhi Johari asserts that "Ideology is a guide upon which a nation finds
direction in and achieves objectives of its national development ... We [Malaysia]
perceive and practise freedom of choice and democracy differently. Our
perception and practice are not simi lar to that of the developed countries." 25
Malaysia's television industry has grown with this ethos. The national
broadcaster - Radio Television Malaysia (RTM) - was launched in December
1963 with two networks, TV I and TV2. According to the Director General of
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RTM, Jaafar Kam in: "TV I is considered the natio nal network in the sense that
the programs are aimed towards developing a national id entity through a
co mm on language." 2" TV2 screens more foreign fi lm s and enterta inm ent
programmes, as well as those in other Malaysian languages s uch as Eng li sh,
Tamil and Mandarin.
TV3 is perhaps the most interes tin g component of the e lec troni c media in
Malaysia- particularly its relationship with UMNO. TV3's major shareholder,
Fleet Holdin gs, has grow n to 'astronomi ca l proportion s' during the years of
UMNO rule, having been initi ally set up in the 1970s to "wres t co ntrol of the
print media" from Ma laysian -Chin ese a nd foreign ownership.~ Fleet a lso
controls the daily newspapers New Straits Times, Ma lay Ma il, Berita Harian,
Shin Min and three Sunday newspapers, as well as extensive book publishing and
industrial, transport and banking enterpri ses . ~8 Through this aiTa ngeme nt - which
satisfies Malay or Bumiputera2Y aspirations as defined in govern ment policy UMNO governments exercise considerable control and influence on news. They
have "an ass urance that the company will toe the govern me nt line in terms of
politics". 30
7

Relations betwee n the foreign media a nd the Malaysian govern me nt have
become increas in g ly tenuous.
I n 1985, Far East Economic Review
correspondent James Clad was charged under the Official Secrets Act over the
publication of details from a leaked docume nt about Ma laysia's relations with
China. The following year, a three month ban on the dist rib ution of the The
Asian Wall Street Journal was ordered along with the expulsion of the paper's
two reporters. The row was over articles about cronyism in ba nkin g a nd
economic mi sman agemen t in govern me nt. 31 Such epi sodes suggest the
government 's motivation has less to do with concerns of ethnic harmony and a
democratic way of life as defined in Rukun egara than with maintenance of state
power.

Singapore: Prosperity and Paternalism
In a similar fashion, Singapore's Peoples ' Action Party (PAP) governments have
controlled news on the grounds of nation building and communal harmony .
Nair, representing the government viewpoint, argues:

The first and continued priori(y is creating one nation, one people out of the
different religions and races ... The visceral, emotional pools are strong and
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the social cohesion can easily be stirred if the press is allowed to abet and
polarize the racial and religious differences by playing on emotions.n
To entrench this priority a raft of laws and regulations, some dating back to the
colonial period, remain in force. However, newer laws covering sedition and
racial issues were "written to ensure social cohesion and that the freedom of the
media are subordinate to the over-riding integrity of Singapore". 33
Despite its status as a hub of regional communications and a convenient location
for many regional news bureaux, Singapore has experienced deteriorating
relations with the international press since the mid- 1980s. Haas attributes this to
the uncertainty surrounding the departure of Lee Kuan Yew from the prime
ministership. In these circumstances " the government acted as if it preferred to
have a Third World policy". 34
A spate of circulation restrictions on foreign journals occurred in 1986 and 1987.
This was made possible by two amendments to the Newspaper and Printing Press
Act which empowered the government to "restrict the sales or distribution of
foreign publications which have been declared as having engaged in the domestic
politics of Singapore" 35 In the course of the next two years drastic restrictions
were placed on the circulation of Time, the Asian Wall Street Journal, Far
Eastern Economic Review and Asiaweek in which the publications could only
distribute several hundred copies in Singapore, often stripped of advertising.
Afterwards, Lee Kuan Yew told the American Society of Newspaper Editors:
"Singapore's domestic debate is a matter for Singaporeans. We allow American
journalists in Singapore in order to report Singapore to their fellow countrymen
... But we cannot allow them to assume a role in Singapore that the American
media play in America, that of invigilator, adversary, and inquisitor of the
administration." 36
To an extent, this situation reflects the weakness of the domestic media, both the
compliant press and news service of the Singapore Broadcasting Corporation,
which maintains an electronic media broadcast monopoly. 37 Of all the countries
in this study, Singapore has achieved the greatest economic development. As
will be argued in the following chapters, its maintenance of authoritarian
information structures in a liberal economic environment is increasingly
untenable. Haas argues that this policy is socially and politically contradictory,
positing: "National unity cannot be perfected by preventing mature political
expression." 38
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Thailand: A Contrast of Styles
Thailand is something of an oddity in this study. Firstly, it has not been
colonised in modern times and therefore has less arbitrarily defined borders or
the related racial tensions. ' Nation-building' rarely appears in Thai media
literature. Secondly, despite a string of military governments, the Thai press is
relatively liberal. However, its television news does not have the same
tradition. 39 Thailand's value in research stems from the fact that it has witnessed
a national crisis since the arrival of international satellite television. A case can
be made that those services contributed to the political patterns during and after
the crisis. This will be canvassed in later chapters.
Unlike the paramountcy of Pancasila in Indonesian Journalists' code of ethics,
the code of the Thai Press Association states: "Promotion and maintenance of
freedom of the press shall be the most important task of every member".' 0 In a
comprehensive review of Thai media history, Chirasopone asserts that Thai press
controls have "fluctuated wildly between complete freedom and virtually
complete repression" since the end of the absolute monarchy in 1932. 41 The
fortunes of the press have waxed and waned with the various civilian and
military governments which have become something of a hallmark of
contemporary Thai politics. Several press control acts remain in place, but have
not been used extensively since the 1970s.' 2
Television began in Thailand much earlier than in other ASEAN countries. By
1991 ninety three per cent of Thai households had access to television.' 3 News
on the five national networks, Channels 2, 3, 5, 7 and 9 and the Bangkok station
Channel I I is closely controlled by the Commun ications Authority of Thailand.
The print media enjoy far greater freedom compared to radio and television,
which have been government monopolies . Unlike the print media, the electronic
media have not changed much since they were first introduced more than 50
years ago, especially in their relationship with the administration. Radio and
television are almost completely controlled by government.+~
The terrestrial networks have been supp lemented in the past few years by two
Bangkok based narrowcasting networks - IBC and Thai Sky. In 1990 IBC began
relaying CNN live to its viewers, although under the eye of the MCOT.
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Indonesia: Pancasila and Palapa
The pervasiveness of Pancasila in Indonesia's media system has already been
alluded to in this chapter. The official role of media is quite unambiguous .

{T}he press has been a very important element in th e process of nationbuilding, because ideas, policies and suggestions have to be disseminated
through the press, including the electronic media ... {T}h e press does not
participate as an observer, a critic, or a controller of the Indonesian system
as is the case in the Western system. No, it takes an active role, and has done
so, in preserving and enhancing the national system, based upon the
Pancasila philosophy. ~
5

These media requirements have not always existed in Indonesia. Upon
independence from the Dutch, Indonesia adopted a multi-party parliamentary
system. In this climate a vigorous and competitive press developed. Reflecting
the contemporary Indonesian government perspective on this period, Sinaga
records that the press "did not contribute much towards the needed stability in
the country. Instead, it became an instrument of the various political parties and
political groups" .46 While the Indonesian media of the 1950s was partisan, it was
also ideologically diverse. This calls into question the idea that political
consensus is somehow a tradition or cultural characteristic. In a study of
Indonesian media, Tickell casts doubt on arguments that the 1950s experience
was an 'un-lndonesian aberration'. "There have been times where the press in
Indonesia has been direct and trenchant in its criticism of political le aders . "~ 7
However, under Sukarno's guided democracy period and the New Order regime
from 1966, media came under the influence of the military as part of its dual
function (dwi fungsi) of military and socio-political roles. "[S]ubstantial, direct
army involvement in political affairs were to fundamentally change the ' rules'
under which the Indonesian press worked."~ 8
The rules of the Pancasila press are complex and detailed, but only a brief outline
is required here to press the point that they are tools of significant state control
and broadly reflect the New Order government's attitude to news. Amendments
in 1982 to the 1966 Press Act require each press enterprise to obtain a publication
permit. These licences can be revoked without trial if, for instance, a publication
is judged to have endangered political stability that is required for economic
development.~ Publications are obliged to "strengthen national unity" and
integrity and to "exercise social control which is constructive". 50 The threat of
9
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revocation of licences if these obligations are not met would appear to be a factor
pressuring journalists towards self-censorship - "one of the worst types of
restraint because of its subtle, insidious and habit-forming possibilities". 5 ' The
threats are numerous, public, and quite specific. For instance, The Jakarta Post
of 5 June 1989 reports of three formal government reprimands to newspapers for
"misquoting cabinet ministers" and "printing off the record statements". The
item was based on a press release from the Ministry of Information and recorded
that all editors had apologised "for their errors". The article reported that the
ministry "admonished Media Indonesia to be more careful in the future " ... so
that the government will not be forced to revoke the daily's licence"." 52 A more
dramatic example arose earlier this year with the closure of the Indonesian
magazines Tempo, Editor and Ditik because of their coverage of tensions within
the Indonesian government, television has evolved with a similar journalistic
ethos. However Indonesia's television industry has a rather special place in Asia
through the country's ownership of the Palapa satellite. The system remains a
key conduit of information exchange and delivery in the region.
The early days of Indonesian television were low-key and rather inauspicious.
The national television network Television Republik Indonesia (TVRI)
commenced broadcasts on 24 August 1962 in preparation for the Asian Games
in Jakarta. The next year President Sukarno outlined the basic policy guidelines
for programmes, including news. The key point was "the statement of the task
and function of television as a tool serving and supporting the development of
the Indonesian nation". 53 With Sukarno's downfall in 1966, the New Order
Government of Suharto assigned three policy goals to TVRI: " the promotion of
national unity and integration; the promotion of national development; the
promotion of political stability". 5' Under these guidelines there has been "heavy
emphasis on development events, the restraint from controversial and ethnically
sensitive issues, the concentration on news in and around the capital - these
characteristics can best be understood in the context of the political system, the
policy goals, and the plural society". 55 Recent government statements reinforce
the state orientation of Television Republik Indonesia (TVRI), labelling its
function as promoting national unity and integrity, national development and
political stability. 56
Indonesia's first commercial television network- RCTI- was opened in 1989.
Delivered by Palapa satellite, viewers require a decoder to view the service. As
mentioned, this channel is closely aligned to the ruling elite of Indonesia. The
channel telecasts more popular Western programming than TVRI. At its
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inauguration ceremony, the Information Minister, Harmoko, said "RCTI must
make sure that its broadcasts don't have negative impact on the national cu lture
and local values". 57 Since then two more commercial networks have emerged in
Indonesia: SCTV and the former education channel Televisi Pendidikan
Indonesia (TPI). 58
This brings us to the development of the Palapa satellite system. Indonesia was
the first developing nation to launch its own domestic satellite and the third of all
nations, after the US and Canada. The first Palapa satellite was launched in
1976, its role to improve domestic telecommunications and television
penetration across the archipelago . Before that time television could only be
received around Jakarta and a few large provincial centres. Not surprisingly,
themes of nation-building and development were a feature of government
statements surrounding Palapa.
Perhaps reflecting the Javanese ethnocentrism often attributed to Jakarta 's ruling
state elite, Indonesia's former foreign minister, Mochtar Kusuma-Atmadja said
in 1988:

The satellite communications system ... plays an important role in the
country's national development. In a country such as Indonesia, whose
peoples cover a broad spectrum from the stone-age civilization in Irian Jaya
to the computer-age community in the capital ... the building of an entity
which can call itself a modern nation is indeed a great challenge. In
Indonesia, the nation building role is played mainly by, or through,
television. 59
Evidence from the US-based East-West Centre and the Indonesia Science
Institute suggested the Indonesian government's Palapa strategy was working.

[T]elevision broadcasts using the Palapa have increased the public's national
awareness considerably and impro ved the rural com!IIUnity's ability to speak
the national language. It has also proven to be an effective agent of
innovation in the sectors ofagriculture, education,fami!y planning and public
health.ro
Evidence from the US based East-West Centre and the Indonesia Science
Institute suggested that the Indonesian government 's Palapa strategy was
working.
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Television's penetration in Indonesia is impressive, especially in contrast to
the print media, largely due to Palapa. Indonesian television reaches more
than 100 million viewers each day- more than tiVo thirds of the populatio11. ~
1

However, at the same time as domestic uses arose for Palapa, there also
developed an international perspective. As outlined in the introduction, the
primary Palapa footprint covers not only Indonesia, but an area from Bangladesh,
across southern China to Taiwan and down to Papua New Guinea and northern
Australia. For one thing, this introduced the phenomenon of 'spill-overs' to the
region, where owners of parabolic antennae could tune into broadcasts from
neighbouring countries.
This international perspective is absolutely critical to this paper when it is seen
in the context of the global economy. At the time the New Order government
was pressing for nation-building and development, it was also seeking to expand
into the international marketplace. A key catalyst was the slump in oil prices of
the 1980s. The government had become dependent on oil revenues for the
expansion of national infrastructure in the 1970s. Indonesia's television system
was among this infrastructural development. "TVRI's activities only began to
pick up in the 1970s when the oil boom brought in profits for the nation." 62 In
turn, the collapse of oil prices prompted the government to seek non-oil export
earnings.
One response was to seek more foreign economic activity in Indonesia. In 1987
Hainsworth noted: "Efforts are being intensified to rekindle the interest and
stimulate the participation of foreign firms in Indonesia's economic revival.""" In
a sense, there was a need to use whatever fruits of Indonesian modernisation
existed in the international marketplace. One area was telecommunications. In
this climate, the Indonesian government rented satellite transponder space to
neighbouring countries for the delivery of their domestic services. Malaysia, The
Philippines and Thailand had become the initial users of Palapa in 1978 using
five transponders, but during the 1980s the number rented to ASEAN
governments or organisations climbed to fifteen. By 1990, each of these
transponder rentals earned Indonesia US$1 million annually
While this policy
did bring in valuable export revenue, it meant viewers in each country could
watch the material from any other provided they owned a parabolic antenna.
During this time a rapid growth occurred in the ownership of the parabolic
antennae. Recent figures suggest the number of households and hotel rooms
receiving services via Palapa are 564,000 in Indonesia, 140,000 in Thailand and
68,000 in Malaysia.''5
.(>l
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In effect, the policy of delivering other countries ' domestic services via the
Palapa satellite exposed a chink in the armour of media sovereignty. By
becoming involved in the international communications marketplace, the
Indonesian government gave television viewers in four ASEAN countries the
opportunity to watch each other's programming. It will be argued in Chapters 3
and 4 that this internationalisation of programming contributed to the
deregulation of domestic television several years later in some countries and laid
the groundwork for the arrival of European and United States broadcasters. In
line with the long-standing media control ethos, an attempt was made by the
Indonesian government in 1986 to restrict the use of parabolic antennae for the
viewing of foreign services. This was, however, judged three years later by the
director of TVRI to be 'difficult to enforce' .66 Elements of the government were
perhaps sensing that the genie was out of the bottle, but had not yet officially
acknowledged Indonesians could watch services from other countries.

Summary
News and information via the mass media have been a cornerstone of Southeast
Asian governments' efforts to entrench state power. Indonesia, Singapore and
Malaysia embody the ethnically diverse, post-colonial states, whose leaderships
embarked on programmes of nation-building to cement their authority. In the
immediate post-independence era in Southeast Asia, pluralist press systems
emerged that reflected the class and ethnic divisions in the societies. These
systems have been gradually brought under state control in Indonesia, Malaysia
and Singapore through a combination of educative and punitive measures. There
remains persistent tension though as Western-liberal practices endure, among
both indigenous and foreign journalists. There is little evidence of such tension
in state television, perhaps because it developed only after the authoritarian state
systems were well-entrenched. Television policies are a product of those
systems. Industry hardware and programme control belongs to the state.
The first signs of erosion of the state monopoly of television news occurred as
Indonesia entered the international telecommunications marketplace. While the
ASEAN customers of Palapa were careful to respect each other's sovereignty,
economic pressures and international elite collaboration were to pave the way for
partnerships with Western companies.
The fact that the hardware (parabolic antennae) for reception was in place across
such a large area made the facility highly attractive to international media
organisations, which were looking to expand from the developed world. The
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Indonesian state was becoming a player in an industry from which it derived
economic benefits. The offset was that this diluted its hitherto well-entrenched
control over media. In a broad economic sense the government was cornered.
"The rapidly increasing national debt and reliance on foreign sources of loan and
investment capital meant that international business was now in a more
favourable position to dictate terms." 67
Each of the states in this paper has followed a developmental media policy in
one form or another. From the evidence in the chapter, there is a strong case to
suggest a lack of dynamism in the concept of development journalism. The
increased economic development and industrialisation it encourages mean that,
in time, it will be internally challenged as material living standards improve.
This gives rise to tension between increasingly affluent sections of the polity which may demand media liberalisation - and the restrictive environment that, in
part, has contributed to that affluence. In a sense, the policy contains a sunset
clause.
The policies of economic liberalisation and telecommunications development while designed to encourage national growth through economic strength - were
to spawn sizeable unintended consequences. The scope and pace of change in
the region's electronic media sector over a period of just a few years was to be
massive and far reaching.
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